Introduction
This chapter examines the intercultural relations between ethnic Russians who have continued to live in two newly independent states (Latvia and Azerbaijan) that emerged after the collapse of the USSR in 1991. Many former Russian citizens involuntarily changed their status from Soviet citizens with Russian nationality, and became ethnic minorities -even people without citizenship -in these newly independent states. In this study, we are interested in whether patterns of intercultural relations between members of dominant group and the Russian minority in these countries are similar or different compared each with other. Latvia and Azerbaijan present two very different national contexts in which to examine this issue: because Latvia is very high in the diversity index, while Azerbaijan is in the middle. However, Latvia and Azerbaijan are similar on the other two indexes: they are at the bottom of the migrant integration index, and both are near the bottom on the multiculturalism policy index. We investigate the intercultural relations between members of the host population and ethnic Russians in these two countries with different trajectories of post-Soviet development, Latvia and Azerbaijan, guided by the three MIRIPS hypotheses (multiculturalism, contact, integration).
Context of Intercultural Relations in Latvia and Azerbaijan

Latvia
Demography. As noted above, Latvia is very high on the ethnic diversity index, indicating that it is a highly culturally diverse country, of just over two million people. Relations between the dominant ethnic group (the Latvians) and other ethnic groups play an important role in Latvia's domestic policy (Apine, 2010) . Other ethnic groups therefore constitute a significant force in the shared experience of Latvian society. Ethnic Russians form the second-largest ethnic group by size (26.0%) after Latvians themselves (61.4%). Non-citizens represent around 15% of the population; of these, 64% were Russians. Russians are thus in a unique position owing to a change in their status. Before the Soviet Union broke up, Russians in Latvia were the ethnic majority in the whole USSR, but, after the fall, they immediately became the ethnic minority in the independent Latvia by numbers and by their status and power. Modern European standards of democracy require Latvia to provide equal rights for both the dominant ethnic group and ethnic minorities when it comes to political participation. Latvia's official policy toward national minorities is defined as "integration while preserving cultural and ethnic identity" (Permanent Mission of the Republic of Latvia to the United Nations, 2016). In Latvia, national minorities are officially defined as Latvian citizens who differ from ethnic Latvians by their culture, religion, or language and who have traditionally been living in Latvia for a long time and who consider themselves a part of the Latvian state and society. People who are not citizens of Latvia are not considered members of a national minority, but they still enjoy the same rights as national minorities unless the law places restrictions on them.
However, this definition presents a problem for national minorities, in particular for non-citizens residing in Latvia for an extended period of time (typically since the end of the Soviet Union). In 2014, there were 276,797 non-citizens residing in Latvia (12.77% of Latvia's total population; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia, 2015). In comparison, citizens of the former Soviet Union who were residing in Russia or in other independent states (for instance, Lithuania, Azerbaijan, but not Estonia) after the fall of the Soviet Union received citizenship in these countries automatically.
Non-citizens of Latvia are not refugees; they are guaranteed almost the same rights as Latvian citizens; they have the right to reside permanently in Latvia and also have the same social guarantees as citizens. The main difference in rights is that non-citizens cannot vote or be elected and cannot hold public office or positions related to national security.
Policy. In 1994, Latvia adopted an official citizenship law that described the naturalization procedure that began in 1995. Naturalization is the process by which an applicant for citizenship is awarded Latvian citizenship after passing exams on the Latvian language and on the history of Latvia, and after swearing an oath to the Latvian Republic. But, in reality, this process better represents assimilation than integration because the purpose of naturalization is the gradual removal of the Russian language from daily communication.
Language is, after all, one of the strongest ties people have with their culture. The second step in carrying out the assimilation policy toward the Russian minority in Latvia has its roots in education. In 1998, a new education law had a significant impact on the education of ethnic minorities in Latvia (Republic of Latvia, 1998). Before 1999, there were both "Latvian" schools and schools for ethnic minorities in Latvia. Teaching in schools for ethnic minorities was carried out in their native language (for example, in Russian schools children were taught in Russian), and the state language (Latvian) was taught also as a special subject. The 1998 law introduced a new concept, referring to "schools using national minority educational programs." (Republic of Latvia, 1998) In this way, the Russian language started to gradually become less relevant in education. Therefore, we can conclude that although its declared integration policy is called 'integration', Latvia is actually implementing a gradual assimilation policy for ethnic minorities. Education reform in Latvia has become a catalyst for dissent among the Russian-speaking population. (Sytin¸2012; Skrinnik, 2009) . Intercultural relations in Latvia are sometimes evaluated as a conflict-prone by experts (Rodin, 2013) .
Azerbaijan
Demography. Russians have lived in Azerbaijan for more than 180 years since the middle of the nineteenth century. The first wave of Russian migration in Azerbaijan was during the period from 1830 to 1850. The second wave was in the late nineteenth -early twentieth centuries and was caused by the development of the oil industry. These Russians were employed mostly in the industrial and administrative sectors. They played the most important role in the development of Azerbaijan during the Soviet period (Kerimov, 2010) . The Russian language in Azerbaijan was not only the official language, but also prevailed in everyday communication in the domestic sphere. During the Soviet period, Azerbaijan virtually became a Russian-speaking republic (Karavaev, 2008) .
Russians emigrated en masse from Azerbaijan in the 1980-1990s after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the formation of the independent Republic of Azerbaijan. In the 30 years following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian population decreased from 475,000 to 180,000. Today, Russians in Azerbaijan amount to only 1.34% of the total population. They are the third-largest ethnic group in the republic (after Azerbaijanis and Lezgins; Perepisi naseleniya Azerbaydzhana, 2013). Russians who stayed in Azerbaijan after the collapse of the USSR received citizenship in this country automatically (Vykhovanets, 2005) .
The reasons for the out-migration of Russians were numerous: unstable political situation; a long Armenian-Azerbaijani NagornoKarabakh conflict; the economic crisis; the destruction of the industrial sector where Russians traditionally worked; narrowing of the scope of the Russian language; and increasing psychological discomfort of Russians, and so on (Popov, 2010) .
Evaluation of the MIRIPS Hypotheses
We have evaluated the three hypotheses of intercultural relations (the multiculturalism hypothesis, the contact hypothesis and the integration hypothesis) in both the independent states of Latvia and Azerbaijan in order to reveal similarities and differences in mutual adaptation to changing socio-cultural contexts in the former soviet republics after the collapse of Soviet Union.
Latvia. There is a lack of previous research on intercultural relations in Latvia. However, while the declared policy in Latvia is called 'integration', Latvia is actually implementing a gradual assimilation policy for ethnic minorities. Education reform in Latvia has become a catalyst for dissent among the Russian-speaking population (Sytin¸2012; Skrinnik, 2009) . As a result, intercultural relations in Latvia are sometimes evaluated as a conflict-prone by experts (Rodin, 2013) .
Studies show that in Latvia there is evidence for discrimination of ethnic minorities, especially against their languages, employment, participation in elections (Hughes, 2005; Ivlevs, 2008) . The possible reasons of such a discriminatory policy are the desire of the Latvian government to protect the socio-economic status of the Latvians (Horowitz, 1998; Docquier, Rapoport, 2003) ; to eliminate the historical injustice based on preferential treatment of the Russian language and culture in the Soviet period (Horowitz, 1998) ; and the fear of ethnic Latvians that they will lose their language and culture (Hanovs, 2010) . There is an opinion that in Latvia there are probably not a minority and majority, but two minority groups. This is because the Latvians still partly feel like a minority, and in some urban areas, they are a numerical minority, while the Russians have had minority status since 1992 (Rosenvalds, 2012) . Both groups are afraid of losing their culture and language, and this hinders their mutual integration. This situation contributes to the fact that Latvia has developed two sustainable subcultures, formed on the basis of the Russian and Latvian languages (Muiznieks, 2010; Golubeva, 2010) . These subcultures manifest themselves in the media as well as in everyday communication. Very few people are included in both subcultures; most people exist in the two separate parallel cultural worlds (Golubeva,2010) .
Researchers have described three possibilities for ethnic Russians in the Baltic states: a) they will either assimilate into ethnic Balts, b) they will integrate within the Baltic states, and c) they will separate by becoming culturally and politically divergent from the Balts (Kronenfeld, 2005, p., 255 ). An empirical study conducted within Berry's acculturation framework demonstrated that integration is the most favored strategy for Latvian Russian and marginalisation is the least preferred one (Pisarenko, 2006) .
The position of Russians is debated actively in Latvia and other Baltic states. Opinions about fate of Russians "range from the shrill cry of Latvian rightists that all Baltic Russians are an alien fifth column (and should be immediately deported), to the equally unsubtle view among some Russians that the Balts, with no independent culture of their own, should accept the Russians as their superiors" (Kronenfeld, 2005, p. 248) . The rejection of Russians by Latvians is clearly associated with their large population in the country. One empirical study demonstrated a significant interactive relationship between the size of the Russian population and the strength of Latvian nationalism (Bloom, 2008) . However, Russians are trying to adapt to this situation, and there is empirical evidence that Russophones in the Baltic states are in the process of forming a new, Baltic Russian, identity (Kronenfeld, 2005) .
Azerbaijan. The findings of previous studies of intercultural relations in Azerbaijan in the post-Soviet period, differ greatly. The data of conflict monitoring, based on the experts' interviews in [2003] [2004] , showed that the level of intercultural conflicts in Azerbaijan is higher than in other republics of the former USSR (Tishkov & Stepanov, 2004) . However, in general, the results of many studies haven't shown significant problems in inter-ethnic relations in Azerbaijan. Members of all ethnic groups have a high level of ethnic tolerance, a willingness to work and study in multiethnic collectives, have interethnic friendships, aimed on inter-ethnic cooperation in different spheres (Guliev, 2012; Azerbaydzhan v 2006 godakh. Sotsiologicheskiy monitoring, 2011 Faradov, 2011) .
The Russian language is still widely used in everyday communication in Azerbaijan, and 47% of ethnic Azerbaijanis speak Russian (Musabekov, 2011) . The Russian language is widespread among the Azerbaijani elite; it helps to make a good career (Karavaev, 2008) . Not one Russian school has been closed, more than 109,000 schoolchildren (11%) and 20,000 university students are studying in Russian. In 2000, Baku Slavic University (BSU) was founded (Gavrilov, Kozievskaya & Yatsenko, 2008) where the language of instruction is Russian.
However, some studies have shown that the scope of the Russian language in Azerbaijan is being gradually reduced. Since the collapse of the USSR, anti-Russian propaganda has intensified. Russia was seen as an ally of Armenia in the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict (Furman, Abbasov, 2001; Yunusov, 2001) . Public opinion polls show that only a very small part of the population of Azerbaijan has positive attitudes towards Russia (Azerbaydzhan v 2006 godakh. Sotsiologicheskiy monitoring, 2011 .
Based on these data we can suppose that the context of intercultural relations between Azerbaijani and Russians provides good conditions for mutual integration due to the use of both languages in everyday communication and high ethnic tolerance.
In this study, we evaluate the three hypotheses of intercultural relations (the multiculturalism hypothesis, the contact hypothesis and the integration hypothesis) in both independent states of Latvia and Azerbaijan in order to reveal similarities and differences in mutual adaptation to changing socio-cultural contexts in the former soviet republics after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Table 3 .1 presents the age and gender statistics for both samples. The sample in Latvia included 699 adult respondents: Latvians (N = 363) and ethnic Russians (N = 336). The sample in Azerbaijan included 607 adult respondents: 300 Azerbaijanis and 307 ethnic Russians. See Table 3 .1 for age and gender statistics. The study in Latvia was carried out in the city of Riga, which is the capital of this country. The survey in Azerbaijan was mostly conducted in the city of Baku, the capital of the country. Eighty percent of ethnic Russians in Azerbaijan live in the city of Baku according to the census of the population in this country (Perepisi naseleniya Azerbaydzhana, 2013) . Additionally, the survey was conducted in the two regions of Azerbaijan, where ethnic Russians live (Ismaillinsky and Khachmazsky).
Method
Samples
Measures
The study used scales and items from the MIRIPS questionnaire. The items were translated into Russian and adapted for use in Russia (Lebedeva & Tatarko, 2009 and were translated into Latvian and adopted for use in Latvia by our colleague I. Plotka. All the Azerbaijanis were interviewed in Baku and filled out the questionnaire in Russian, because in Baku they speak Russian as well as the Azerbian language.
The following scales were used from the MIRIPS questionnaire: Perceived cultural security; Intercultural contacts; Multicultural ideology; Intercultural strategies of non-dominant groups; Intercultural expectations of dominant groups; Ethnic tolerance; Life satisfaction; Self-esteem; and Demographic variables (gender, age, and level of education).
Procedure
In Latvia a snowball technique was used. Our Latvian colleagues interviewed Latvian and Russian university students first and then asked them to interview their ethnic Latvian and ethnic Russian friends, acquaintances, colleagues, and relatives. For Russians, the survey was conducted in Russian; for Latvians it was conducted in Latvian. The research in Azerbaijan, was conducted by the Center for Research of Development and International Cooperation (SIGMA). They used convenience sampling in the survey process. For both Russians and Azerbaijanis, the survey was conducted in Russian.
Data Processing
For the testing of our three hypotheses, we used structural equation modeling (SEM) with AMOS version 20. We also used path analysis with AMOS version 19 (Arbuckle, 2010) . This instrument allows the evaluation of a series of simultaneous hypotheses, taking measurement errors into account (see Bollen & Pearl, 2013) . During the data processing, separate models were constructed for the each of the four samples. Results
Statistics
Descriptive statistics, including means, standard deviations are presented in Table 3 .2. In the Table 3 .2, there are several trends in the differences between respondents from Latvia and Azerbaijan.
Security. The level of perceived security is significantly higher in participants from Azerbaijan than in those from Latvia; and it is higher among the ethnic majority (the Azerbaijani) than among the Russians.
Contact. The Russians in Azerbaijan assessed intercultural contacts with the ethnic majority as more intensive than did the Russians in Latvia; this is expected, as the number of the Russians in Azerbaijan is relatively small. At the same time, the Latvians assessed the intensity of contacts with the Russians higher than the Russians themselves with the Latvians do. The ethnic majorities and minorities evaluated acceptability of multicultural ideology in these two countries in the same way, but there are differences between the countries: the level of acceptability of multicultural ideology in Azerbaijan is higher than in Latvia. The preference for Integration is higher among the Russians in Azerbaijan compared to the Russians in Latvia.
Intercultural strategies and expectations. The preference for Assimilation among ethnic majorities' members is higher than among Russians in both republics. The preference of Assimilation among the Latvians is higher than among the Azerbaijani. The level of ethnic tolerance is higher in Azerbaijan, than in Latvia. Within the republics, it is higher among Russians in Latvia, and among the Azerbaijani in Azerbaijan.
Life satisfaction of the Russians in Azerbaijan is slightly higher than life satisfaction of the Azerbaijani themselves, but does not differ from that of the Russians in Latvia. Self-esteem of the Russians is statistically significantly higher among the Russians in Azerbaijan compared with the Russians in Latvia.
The overall pattern is that the comparison of the main variables between the groups and republics demonstrates that there is more successful mutual acculturation of the Azerbaijani majority and the Russian minority in Azerbaijan compared with Latvians and Russians in Latvia.
We next tested all three hypotheses of intercultural relations in the combined models with all four samples using structural equation modelling. The tested model presented in the Figure 3 .1 was built according to the three hypotheses. In fact the empirical models have many more direct links than are shown; all of them are presented in the Tables 3.3 and 3.4. The results for the Russian minority and Latvians in Riga are presented in Table 3 .3. The data of Russian minority and Latvians in Latvia are presented in the same table using slash.
Assessment of the models' fits indicates that all the goodness-of-fit indices are exceptionally good for the Russian sample (χ2/df= 2.2; CFI=.97; RMSEA=.06; PCLOSE=.27) as well as for the Latvian sample (χ2/df=2.6; CFI=.98; RMSEA=.06; PCLOSE=.21).
The percentage of variance explained by socio-demographic variables (gender and age) is either equal to zero or very small (0.01-0.03). So, we can postulate, that age and gender do not play significant roles in these two models.
5.2
We Now Describe the Findings of Russians in Latvia and Latvians.
Multiculturalism hypothesis. Perceived security had a positive and significant effect on ethnic tolerance (β =.28, p <.001) and multicultural Contact hypothesis. Intercultural contacts significantly and positively predicted the integration (β =.25, p <.001) strategy of Latvian Russians, but had no significant effect on their ethnic tolerance. In Latvians, intercultural contacts affect neither tolerance nor the integration expectation. Therefore, the contact hypothesis has been partly confirmed in the Latvian Russians, but not in the Latvians.
Integration hypothesis. The integration expectation of Latvians had a significant and positive impact on self-esteem (β =.14, p <.05), but had no significant impact on their life satisfaction. The preference for the integration strategy in Latvian Russians had no statistically significant impact on either measure of psychological adaptation. Therefore, the integration hypothesis has been partly supported with Latvians, but not with Latvian Russians.
Also, we have obtained additional results concerning the role of assimilation in the mutual acculturation of Latvians and Russians in Latvia. Perceived security had a significant positive impact on the preference for assimilation among Russians in Latvia (β =.13, p <.05) and significant negative impact among Latvians (β = -.13, p <.05). Moreover, intercultural contacts of Russians with Latvians also have significant positive effects on their assimilation preferences (β =.22, p <.001), while intercultural contacts of Latvians with Russians had no effects on their assimilation expectations. Assimilation preferences had significant negative impact on the self-esteem of Latvian Russians (β = -.42, p <.001) as well as of Latvians (β = -.19, p <.05).
In addition it is important to note that we found negative correlation between intercultural contacts and perceived security among Latvians (r=-18; p <.01). This means that the higher the intercultural contacts, the lower perceived security and vice versa. This unusual finding will be examined in the discussion.
Results
We now examine the results of testing the three hypotheses in Azerbaijan with groups of Azerbaijanis and ethnic Russians (see Table 3 .4). Assessment of the models' fits indicates that all the goodness-of-fit indices are exceptionally good for the Russian sample (χ2/df= 1.5; CFI=.99; RMSEA=.04; PCLOSE=.59) as well as for the Azerbaijani sample (χ2/ df= 1.8; CFI=.99; RMSEA=.05; PCLOSE=.42).
The percentage of variance explained by socio-demographic variables (gender and age) is low in both samples except one case: age explains 10 percent of variance of multicultural ideology's impact in the Russian sample.
Multiculturalism hypothesis. The perceived security among Russians in Azerbaijan had a very strong positive effect on ethnic tolerance (β = 0.89, p <.001), significant positive effect on multicultural ideology (β = 0.11, p <.05) and the strategy of integration (β = 0.26, p <.001). At the same time, perceived security had a significant negative effect on assimilation strategy (β = -0.24, p <.001). Perceived security in the group of Azerbaijani also had significant positive effect on multicultural ideology (β = 0.52, p <.001), ethnic tolerance (β = 0.31, p <.001), and integration expectation (β = 0.57, p <.001). Therefore, we can conclude that the integration hypothesis has been fully supported in both Azerbaijanis and Russians in Azerbaijan.
Contact hypothesis. Intercultural contacts of Russians significantly and positively predicted both their preference for integration (β = 0.17, p <.01) and for assimilation (β = 0.15, p <.01), but did not predict their ethnic tolerance. Intercultural contacts of Azerbaijani significantly and positively predicted their ethnic tolerance (β = 0.31, p <.001), but did not predict intercultural expectations of integration and assimilation. Therefore, we can conclude that this hypothesis has been partly supported in both samples.
Integration hypothesis. The integration strategy in Russians in Azerbaijan significantly and positively predicted their life satisfaction (β = 0.18, p <.001) and self-esteem (β = 0.13, p <.05), while intercultural expectation of integration among Azerbaijanis had no significant impact on their life satisfaction and self-esteem. Therefore, the integration hypothesis has been partly supported with Russians in Azerbaijan, and was not confirmed in the Azerbaijanis sample.
It is important to note that we found negative correlation between intercultural contacts and perceived security (r=-43; p <.001) in the sample of Azerbaijanis as we did in the Latvians in Riga.
Discussion
This study is the first to examine the mutual acculturation and intercultural relations of Russians who have become an ethnic minority in two very different post-Soviet societies. It has also compared them to each other and to the dominant populations in these two former Soviet republics. The independent states of Latvia and Azerbaijan are characterized by very different paths of post-Soviet development. This research gives the opportunity to compare the features of such intercultural relations and shed light on the role of the socio-cultural context and acceptability of multicultural ideology in this process. We first discuss the results of evaluating the three hypotheses in both the countries. According to the first hypothesis (multiculturalism), the higher the perceived security, the higher are the intercultural adaptations, as assessed by support for multicultural ideology and ethnic tolerance (for both the minority group and the members of the larger society). For the sample of Latvians, perceived security does have significant impacts on both support for multicultural ideology and ethnic tolerance. However, in the sample of Russians in Latvia there are no significant impacts of perceived security on the acceptance of multicultural ideology and ethnic tolerance. In Azerbaijan, perceived security does have significant impacts on the support for multicultural ideology as well as on ethnic tolerance in both the dominant and the Russian minority groups. Thus the results of the study fully confirmed the multiculturalism hypothesis for three groups: the Latvians, the Azerbaijanis, the Russians in Azerbaijan, but do not support it for the Russian minority in Latvia. This support is important because the findings are from very different kinds of groups: they are with people who are not immigrants, but who have changed their dominant place in society for a minority one.
The contact hypothesis posits the positive impact of friendly intercultural contacts on the acceptance of "cultural others". With respect to tolerance, for Azerbaijanis, their intercultural contacts positively and significantly predicted their level of ethnic tolerance. However, intercultural contacts do not have any significant impact on such acceptance among Latvians. For the Russians in Latvia, having frequent friendly contacts among the host population positively and significantly affected their acculturation strategies of integration and assimilation, just as they did for the Russians in Azerbaijan. So the contact hypothesis is partially confirmed with three groups: Russians in Latvia, Russians in Azerbaijan and Azerbaijanis, but is not confirmed with Latvians. Again, this level of support is an important finding because of the atypical nature of the nondominant groups in these studies.
According to the integration hypothesis, preference for the integration strategy promotes better psychological adaptation. Looking first at the minority Russians, in Latvia, contrary to the hypothesis, their preference for the integration strategy had no significant impact on their life satisfaction or self-esteem. However, among Russians in Azerbaijan, the preference for the integration strategy has positive and significant impact on both measures of psychological adaptation (self-esteem and life satisfaction). Thus, we can conclude that the Russian minorities' preference for the strategy of integration contributed to their self-esteem and life satisfaction only in Azerbaijan.
For the majority groups, the preference for integration among the Latvians in Latvia promoted their self-esteem, but did not promote life satisfaction and self-esteem for the Azerbaijanis in Azerbaijan. Therefore, the integration hypothesis was partially supported in the host population in Latvia and in Russians in Azerbaijan, but it was not supported in the Russians in Latvia and the host population in Azerbaijan.
Thus, all three hypotheses received at least partial support only in one group -Russians in Azerbaijan. The multiculturalism hypothesis was not confirmed with the Russians in Latvia, the contact hypothesis was not supported with the Latvians in Latvia, and the integration hypothesis was not supported with the Azerbaijanis in Azerbaijan and Russians in Latvia. The results of testing the hypotheses in these both countries are presented in the Table 3 .5.
The most important questions are why these hypotheses did not receive support in these three groups: the Latvians in Latvia, the Russians in Latvia, and the Azerbaijanis in Azerbaijan. To answer them we decided to analyze some relationships among the main predictors in the models.
First, why perceived security did not predict acceptance of multicultural ideology and ethnic tolerance, and integration did not predict psychological well-being for Russians in Latvia? According to our results, low level of security positively and significantly correlated with preference for assimilation among Russians in Latvia. These findings require additional analysis of the socio-political and historical context in Latvia in order to understand the psychological outcomes of mutual acculturation of the minority and majority groups. Some parallels in previous research on intercultural relations in Estonia (Kruusvall, Vetic & Berry, 2009 ) might shed light on our results. In Berry's (1997) terms, the Estonian formulation of integration policy incorporates only the participation dimension; the cultural-maintenance dimension is not part of the policy. Thus, the political terminology of integration is much closer to the acculturative expectation of assimilation. The ethnically connoted nation-state model equates integration with forced assimilation. Since the majority of Estonian Russians do not wish to assimilate, integration for them means "something to avoid". Therefore, the term integration itself has a negative meaning among ethnic Russians there (Kruusvall et al., 2009 ). Similarly, we described the Latvian context and policy as promoting assimilation more than integration, despite the opposite wording. This policy might explain why integration did not predict any positive outcomes for either of the groups in Latvia. According to our data, we have different correlations of assimilation with ethnic tolerance and with preference for integration in both groups in Latvia: in Russians these correlations are significant and negative, while in Latvians they are significant and positive. This means that preference for assimilation has different meanings for the Russian minority and the Latvian majority: for Russians it is connected with intolerance and lack of integration; in Latvians it is connected with tolerance and integration. Perhaps for Latvians, assimilation and integration have very close meanings, which is not true for Latvian Russians.
The latter avoid such a type of integration, and it didn't contribute to their psychological well-being. The second question is: why was the contact hypothesis not supported among Latvians? We obtained a significant negative relationship between security and contact in the Latvian sample. This means that intercultural contacts may make Latvians feel less secure or vice versa: low security impedes intercultural contact. Latvians have low levels of security and high levels of intercultural contact. Moreover they assessed the intensity of their intercultural contacts much higher than Russians did, despite the fact that Latvians are a numerical majority in Latvia. Probably this subjective evaluation of excessive intercultural contacts does not promote acceptance of Russians among Latvians. We also obtained a negative relationship between security and contact in Azerbaijanis, but the nature of this relationship is different: a discordance of high perceived security and low intercultural contacts. Such a combination does not impede the contact hypothesis, and contacts promote ethnic tolerance among Azerbaijanis.
But why was the integration hypothesis not supported with Azerbaijanis? Our results have shown that the integration expectation among Azerbaijanis does not promote their life satisfaction and selfesteem. We suppose that the integration of Russians is due to their low proportion in Azerbaijan (1.34%), and the relatively positive mutual attitudes did not significantly contribute to the psychological well-being of Azerbaijanis. At the same time, acceptance of multicultural ideology demonstrated unexpected and disturbing negative relationship with the self-esteem of Azerbaijanis (-.27; p <.001). This means that psychological well-being of the host population of Azerbaijan is sensitive to multicultural ideology, and the latter could reduce the self-esteem of Azerbaijanis. Probably the very small proportion of Russians and their reduced influence on the situation in the republic could explain why relatively positive intercultural relations still existed in Azerbaijan.
What are possible implications of our study? We see the main directions for national integration in Latvia as follows: to facilitate friendly intercultural contacts between Latvians and Russians, while at the same time providing a sense of cultural security (and reducing a sense of threat) in both groups. Differences between integration and assimilation should be more articulated in the multicultural ideology and multicultural policy in Latvia to provide better conditions for the integration of ethnic minorities, which is beneficial for both sides. As to Azerbaijan, the current intercultural relations between Russians and Azerbaijanis are characterized by mutual positive attitudes and the context in the republic provides good grounds for the integration of Russians. But the role of multicultural ideology should be more articulated in public discourse of this country.
There are some limitations of our study. The first limitation concerns the samples which reduces the generalizability of the findings: they are not representative for Azerbaijan as well as for Latvia because data were collected mostly in the capitals of these countries (Baku and Riga). The second limitation concerns the snowball sampling technique, in which respondents were recruited from a narrow circle of friends and acquaintances. To overcome these limitations, we plan to test these three hypotheses in neighbouring countries to compare the findings obtained in different socio-cultural contexts. This approach should allow us to assess the general character of these hypotheses, as well to identify some cultural and national specifics.
